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NUCLEAR FUTURES 
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum Symposium “En-
vironmental Regulation, Energy & Market Entry” is both important 
and timely and the editors are to be congratulated for this project. 
The Symposium is important, linking as it does energy and the envi-
ronment and raising the question of how these two regulatory regimes 
affect our energy future. It has been the case for some time that en-
ergy lawyers and policymakers speak a language different than envi-
ronmental lawyers and policymakers even though energy and the en-
vironment are of a whole.1 Environmental impacts occur throughout 
all energy fuel cycles. Indeed, the consistent market imperfection in 
energy production, distribution, and use involves the negative exter-
nalities of pollution in its many forms.2 Thus, a major point of conver-
gence of energy and the environment concerns whether or not envi-
ronmental regulations affect the market entry of various energy 
producers. In turn, the interaction of energy and the environment di-
rectly affects the shape of energy policy.  Nevertheless, these two 
regulatory regimes tend to focus on and emphasize different ele-
ments. 
The language of energy law and policy, for example, focuses on 
short term gains, economic efficiency, capital investment, return on 
investment, shareholder concerns and the like.3 Energy industries, for 
 
 † Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of Law, University of Cin-
cinnati College of Law; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation. 
 1. Current casebooks and textbooks on energy law and policy connect energy and envi-
ronmental laws and policies and usually do so through economics. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN 
ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000); ENERGY LAW GROUP, 
ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000); MARLA MANSFIELD, THE REEL 
WORLD: CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(2001). 
 2. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 41-47. 
 3. See, e.g., Sam Kalen, Replacing a National Energy Policy with a National Resource Pol-
icy, 19 Nat. Resource & Envt’l 9 (2005); AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A 
DURABLE PEACE 26-31 (1977). 
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the most part, are old, large, established, and politically influential.4 In 
fact, the dominant model of energy policy in the United States con-
sists of large-scale, capital intensive, and mostly fossil fuel industries.5 
The language of the environment is distinct from that of energy. 
Resource preservation, conservation, stewardship, long-term protec-
tion and the like are the stock and trade variables of environmental-
ists.6 To the extent that there is an alternative energy policy in the 
United States which relies on clean and renewable energy sources, its 
contribution to the production of energy has been minimal. For most 
of the last half century, alternative energy resources have never ac-
counted for more than 3% of our energy economy.7 To the extent that 
there are alternative energy producers, those producers tend to be 
small entrepreneurs who do not yet exercise significant political influ-
ence.8 The significance and influence of alternative energy policies 
and alternative producers is changing, however, as a result of in-
creased concerns about the harsh consequences of global warming 
and climate change.9 Still, there exists a gap in our thinking and in our 
conversations about the relationships between energy and the envi-
ronment, a gap reflected in policy and regulation. This Symposium 
presents an opportunity to discuss closing that gap by asking whether 
or not environmental regulations adversely affect energy markets. 
The Symposium is timely because it comes at a critical period in 
the domestic and international conversation about the energy future. 
Over 30 years ago, the United Nations published a report urging gov-
ernments to develop “sustainable societies” that would allow eco-
nomic (and, therefore, energy) growth while protecting the environ-
ment.10 Since that report, the United Nations has held two Earth 
 
 4. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). The underlying complaint 
in that case was that the National Energy Policy Development Group, which wrote the Bush 
Administration’s National Energy Policy, infra note 14, under the leadership of Vice President 
Cheney, was comprised of traditional energy industry representative such as Kenneth Lay of 
Enron and was devoid of environmental representation. 
 5. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COL. L. 
REV. 355 (1990). 
 6. See, e.g., LOVINS, supra note 3, at 38-46; WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). 
 7. DOE ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 276 
(2003) [hereinafter Annual Energy Review 2003]. 
 8. See, e.g., VIJAY V. VAITHEESWARAN, POWER TO THE PEOPLE (2003); LOVINS, supra 
note 3, at ch. 1. 
 9. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. 
 10. The concept of “sustainable development” was introduced at the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. The idea was further developed in 
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Summits addressing sustainable development—one in Rio de Janeiro 
in 199211 and the second in Johannesburg in 2002.12 Domestically, the 
National Energy Polices of the Clinton13 and Bush14 Administrations 
have paid lip service to the concept of sustainable development but 
nothing of note has come from those policies. Today, however, bipar-
tisan thinking about energy and the environment is more visible. 
Shortly after this Symposium, for example, the William J. Clinton 
Presidential Foundation hosted a forum entitled New Thinking on 
Energy Policy: Meeting the Challenges of Security, Development, and 
Climate Change.15 The Clinton Conference brought together interna-
tional business and government leaders to discuss the global future of 
energy. The title of the conference captures the necessity of linking 
energy and the environment and, significantly, of linking both to mat-
ters of security. Two days later, on December 8, 2004, the Bipartisan 
National Commission on Energy Policy issued a major study entitled 
Ending the Energy Stalemate16 which also emphasizes the intercon-
 
UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR 
COMMON FUTURE (1987). This Report, also know as the “Brundtland Commission Report,” 
after its Chair, Prime Minister Gro Brundtland of Norway, defined “sustainable development” 
as meeting the “needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.” Id. at 8. 
 11. For information about the Rio Earth Summit, see http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/ 
enviro.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
 12. For information on the Johannesburg Earth Summit, see http://www.earthsummit 
2002.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
 13. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE 
AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR THE FUTURE (1996). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PLAN (July, 1995); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 
STRATEGIC PLAN: PROVIDING AMERICA WITH ENERGY SECURITY, NATIONAL SECURITY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SCIENCE LEADERSHIP (Sept. 1997); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY, COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY (Apr. 1998). 
 14. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY ch. 
3 (May 2001) [hereinafter National Energy Policy], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
energy/National-Energy-Policy,pdf 
 15. A video of the Forum can be found at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/feature-
energy-1206041.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
 16. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY STALEMATE: A 
BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter 
National Commission Report]. This Commission has been criticized by Public Citizen for being 
too industry oriented and not bipartisan enough; see http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/ 
release.cfm?ID=1837 (Dec. 8, 2004). A year earlier, the Energy Future Coalition, another 
bipartisan group of energy leaders and thinkers published a similar report, ENERGY FUTURE 
COALITION, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A NEW ENERGY FUTURE (June 
2003) [hereinafter Energy Future Coalition], available at http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/ 
full_report/index.shtm. 
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nectedness of energy, the environment, the economy, and security at 
the national and international levels. 
Clearly, recent events indicate a notable shift in thinking about 
energy policy, a shift that pays more attention to environmental im-
pacts and geopolitical realities than before. My topic, nuclear power, 
is a central actor in this emerging drama. When first asked to partici-
pate in this Symposium, my initial response to the question “Do envi-
ronmental regulations affect new market entry by nuclear power pro-
ducers?” was — “No. Environmental regulations have no effect on 
new entrants because the nuclear power industry has been moribund 
for nearly three decades and market investments have simply dried 
up.”17 I could have very easily given the exact opposite answer and 
said: “Yes. Environmental regulations have completely precluded 
new nuclear power entrants because without an answer to the prob-
lem of nuclear waste disposal there will be no new nuclear plants 
coming on line.”18 Both statements are true.  
Economics and environmental concerns affect the market entry 
of nuclear power. Curiously though, heightened concerns about cli-
mate change are beginning to renew interest in nuclear power.  The 
Article proceeds to describe possible nuclear futures and discusses 
what is necessary for market entry for new nuclear plants. Part I 
places the nuclear power industry and its regulation in its historical 
context. This section will identify the core issues that surround the fu-
ture of nuclear power. Part II engages in a thought experiment re-
garding the costs and benefits of nuclear power and its alternatives. 
This Part of the Article establishes the key variables necessary for an 
expansion of nuclear power. Part III presents three alternative nu-
 
 17. See, e.g., PIETRO S. NIVOLA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POLICY BRIEF NO. 138 (2004) (“In America, it is 
safe to say, the halt [in the nuclear industry] has to do with basic economic considerations, not 
just political obstacles. . . . In the teeth of inauspicious market conditions, even the additional 
government intervention that was envisioned in last year’s omnibus energy bill would not suffice 
to entice skeptical investors in the near term.”). 
 18. See National Commission Report, supra note 16,at 58(“Even with success in the cost 
and safety challenges, a new generation of nuclear reactors is unlikely to be built in the United 
States unless and until nuclear plant owners (largely electric utilities) and the public are per-
suaded that the government is able to meet its obligation, under existing law, to take possession 
of and adequately sequester the highly radioactive spent fuel from reactor operations.”). See 
also JOHN DEUTCH & ERNEST J. MONIZ (CO-CHAIRS), THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY ix (2003) [hereinafter MIT Study]. The MIT Study argues that 
“high-level waste can safely be disposed of in geologic repositories . . . . We note, however, that 
among the general public, and even among some in the technical community, there is a lack of 
confidence in the prospects for successful technical and organizational implementation of the 
geologic disposal concept.” Id. at 54. 
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clear power futures from which policy makers must choose. The Arti-
cle concludes by suggesting what the immediate future holds in store 
for commercial nuclear energy. 
I.  THE SITUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER 
A. The State of the Industry 
The United States energy picture can be divided roughly be-
tween oil and electricity, each accounting for about 50 percent of the 
energy consumption in the country.19 The electricity market can be 
divided again with coal accounting for 50 percent of electricity gen-
eration and nuclear power accounting for 20 percent, followed by 
natural gas at 18 percent with the remainder accounted for by all 
other resources including hydropower and other renewables.20 
The commercial nuclear power industry began with a small 60 
megawatt reactor at Shippingsport, Pennsylvania in 1957.21 Today, 
there are 104 nuclear power plants in the country.22 Those plants, 
however, have been operating for some time. No new nuclear power 
plants have come online since 1978 and all plants ordered since 1973 
have been canceled.23 Thus, it is more than fair to say that the nuclear 
power industry in this country has been moribund for 30 years after 
what promised to be a nearly inexhaustible and cheap source of en-
ergy.24 A brief history of nuclear power and its regulation can high-
light this dormancy. 
B. A Nano-History of Nuclear Power Regulation 
Our country, indeed the world, has always viewed nuclear power 
with fear and fascination. The very idea of fissionable atoms with 
their consequent release of large magnitudes of energy has been 
wrapped up with thoughts of both war and peace which continue to 
intrigue us. 
 
 19. Annual Energy Review 2003, supra note 7, at 3. 
 20. Id. at 222. 
 21. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 944. 
 22. MARK HOLT & CARL E. BEHRENS, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: NUCLEAR 
ENERGY POLICY CRS-1 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
 23. Id. 
 24. The classic phrase, made by the first chair of the Atomic Energy Commission Lewis 
Strauss, was that nuclear power would generate electricity “too cheap to meter.” See infra note 
35 and accompanying text. See also STEVEN MARK COHN, TOO CHEAP TO METER: AN 
ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM 107 (1997). 
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The story of atomic energy begins in earnest with the Manhattan 
Project in Los Alamos, New Mexico during World War II25 under the 
direction of General Leslie Groves and Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. 
The Los Alamos project was the world’s largest scientific undertaking 
to that time.26 The first atomic bomb was exploded in Alamogordo, 
New Mexico at Trinity Site in 1945.27 Upon seeing the mushroom 
cloud of radioactive energy after that first experimental explosion 
Oppenheimer commented: “Now I am become death, the destroyer 
of worlds,” quoting the Bhagavad Gita.28 After Alamogordo, the 
bombs were used to bring a conclusion to World War II with the de-
struction of Hiroshima and Nagasaka, Japan.29 Oppenheimer’s quota-
tion strikes us as either odd or melodramatic given the fact that he 
was the lead scientist on the Manhattan Project and was fully knowl-
edgeable about the task at hand. Nevertheless, it captures the fear 
and the fascination of nuclear energy that have gripped the world 
since its inception. The first use of atomic power for belligerent pur-
poses is of renewed concern today. 
After WWII, the future of atomic energy was a matter of interna-
tional realpolitik. The United States was concerned that other coun-
tries, most particularly the then Soviet Union, would acquire nuclear 
weapons capacities. In order to maintain nuclear dominance, US gov-
ernment leaders believed that nuclear power had to be tightly con-
trolled and did so through the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.30 The 1946 
Act established the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor 
agency to today’s Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and invested all 
control of nuclear power in the hands of the military with no civilian 
involvement.31 Such control only intensified the concern that atomic 
energy was to be used as the original weapon of mass destruction, yet 
nuclear power promised so much.32 In particular, nuclear power could 
 
 25. Earlier, in 1942, the first successful fission experiment occurred at the University of 
Chicago. This experiment was a prelude to Los Alamos because the same scientists were in-
volved in both projects. See RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 399-401 
(1986). 
 26. Id. See also Miguel A. Bracchini, The History and Ethics Behind the Manhattan Project 
(Apr. 1997), available at http://www.me.utexas.edu/~uer/manhattan/. 
 27. RHODES, supra note 25, at 669-78. 
 28. Id. at 676. 
 29. Id. at 745 – 47. 
 30. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM: 
THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946 – 1962 ch. 1 (1984). 
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be used as a commercial energy source but the prevailing regulatory 
scheme under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 precluded private own-
ership and commercial development. 
In order to allay public concerns about nuclear power, President 
Eisenhower began advocating the “Atoms for Peace Program,” most 
notably in a speech he gave at the United Nations in December, 
1953.33 Although the speech was benignly titled “Atoms for Peace,” it 
concentrated on US concerns about weapons competition more than 
about the need to move nuclear power away from military uses to 
more peaceful uses. Also at that time, however, private industry was 
lobbying to bring nuclear power onto the commercial stage because 
of the great potential for profit. Industrial pressure for commercial 
use and international competition and concern about arms control 
contributed to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.34 The 
1954 Act completely changed the way the country did its nuclear 
business, moving nuclear power into the hands of the private sector. 
The movement was captured by Atomic Energy Commission Chair-
man, Lewis Strauss, when he said that privatization was good for the 
country because electricity generated by nuclear power would be “too 
cheap to meter.”35 The 1954 Act is largely the regulatory structure 
which governs today. The Act promoted civilian ownership and 
commercial development and thus began the private commercial 
market. 
There was, however, a significant market flaw in the nuclear 
power industry which constituted a complete impediment to commer-
cialization. Simply, nuclear liabilities were too costly for any private 
entrepreneur to undertake, and the industry would not proceed with-
out government support. Financial support came in the form of the 
Price-Anderson Act of 1957,36 which limited the amount of liability a 
utility or reactor manufacturer would incur in the event of a nuclear 
accident.37 During the Price-Anderson Act hearings, a representative 
of General Electric, one of the four key reactor manufacturers, said 
 
 33. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address before the General Assembly of the United nations on 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1953 – 1960 813 – 822 (1960). 
 34. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954). 
 35. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 8 (1987); DANIEL 
FORD, THE CULT OF THE ATOM 50 (1982). 
 36. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 37. James R. Curtis et al., Nuclear Power, in 2 DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM A. MOGEL, 
ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS §54.14 (2002) 
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that GE would not “proceed with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over 
its head.”38 Similarly, Charles Weaver, the CEO of Westinghouse, an-
other reactor manufacturer, said: “We knew at the time that all ques-
tions about ‘safety and risk’ weren’t answered. That’s why we fully 
supported the Price-Anderson Liability Legislation. When I testified 
before Congress, I made it perfectly clear that we could not proceed 
as a private company without that kind of government backing.”39 
Commercialization was given the financial assurance it needed, and 
the Price-Anderson Act has continued to be reauthorized approxi-
mately every 10 years.40 
The effect of the 1954 and 1957 legislation was quick and dra-
matic. Quite simply, utilities could not rush fast enough to order the 
construction of nuclear power plants to become part of what they 
imagined would be the electricity industry in the 21st Century. The 
period between 1957 through the mid 1960’s was known as the Great 
Band Wagon Market for the commercial nuclear power industry.41 
Nuclear plants were the largest electric utilities operating until that 
time and continue to be so through the present. From 1963 to 1969, 
for example, the Atomic Energy Commission issued twenty-eight 
construction permits for plants ranging from 800 to 1100 megawatts 
which constitute the upper range of electric plant.42 During this great 
construction period, nuclear generated electricity ultimately became 
one-fifth of all electricity production.43 As active, optimistic, and ag-
gressive as the Great Band Wagon Market was, the concert ended 
dramatically with the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.44 Depend-
ing upon how one reads history, Three Mile Island was either as close 
 
 38. TOMAIN, supra note 35, at 8 – 9. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Curtis et al., supra note 37, at §54.14[1] [c] & [d]. 
 41. J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTAINING THE ATOM: NUCLEAR REGULATION IN A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, 1963-1971 ch. 2 (1992). See also MARK HERTSGAARD, NUCLEAR 
INC. 44 (1983). 
 42. WALKER, supra note 41, at 34. 
 43. Annual Energy Review 2003, supra note 7, at xxxii (describing nuclear power is equal to 
20% of electricity produced). 
 44. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE 
NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI (1979) (also known as the Kemeny Commission Re-
port). See generally J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND: A NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004). 
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to a core meltdown as a reactor can get,45 or a cautionary tale about 
the development of the industry.46 
This brief history demonstrates two salient points about nuclear 
power. First, the private sector successfully galvanized significant po-
litical support and endorsement for generating electricity with nuclear 
power. This private sector interest coincided with national interests 
and both wanted US control and US market domination of nuclear 
power. The second and persistently troubling point about nuclear 
power is that it does not operate in a workable market. Financially, 
nuclear power does not function without government support. In the 
beginning, there would have been no Great Band Wagon Market 
without Price-Anderson protection. 
After Three Mile Island, however, another gross market flaw 
reared its head. To that time, government policymakers had not paid 
sufficient attention to the back-end of the fuel cycle and had not regu-
lated for permanent radioactive waste disposal. For it was not until 
1982, with the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,47 that the ma-
jor environmental consequence of nuclear waste was addressed legis-
latively. Nuclear power, although carbon-free, is not free from envi-
ronmental impact. 
C. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Environment 
Commercial nuclear power can be divided into three stages—the 
front-end of the fuel cycle; the operational phase of the fuel cycle; and 
the back-end of the fuel cycle. There are environmental consequences 
at each stage and there are regulations to address those conse-
quences. 
The front-end of the fuel cycle involves the mining and milling of 
uranium as well uranium enrichment and fabrication. During the min-
ing and milling phases, radiation hazards are low but are not non-
existent. Mill tailings, the remains of the mining process, contain ra-
don which is environmentally hazardous and carcinogenic. These haz-
ards are addressed in the Uranium Mill Tailings and Radioactive 
Control Act of 1978.48 After the uranium ore is mined, it is then 
milled, which is the process of taking the ore and converting it into 
 
 45. See, e.g., DANIEL F. FORD, THREE MILE ISLAND: THIRTY MINUTES TO MELTDOWN 
(1982). 
 46. NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, THE TMI 2 ACCIDENT: ITS IMPACT, ITS LESSONS (Mar. 
2004), available at http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=294. 
 47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101 – 10226 (2000). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901 – 42 (2000). 
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uranium oxide, a substance commonly referred to as “yellow cake.”49 
The yellow cake is then converted into gaseous uranium hexafluoride, 
which allows for an enrichment process to raise the concentration of 
uranium from non-fissionable U238 to U235, which is a uranium enriched 
isotope capable of causing the necessary chain reaction.50 Once the 
enrichment has taken place, the gas is returned to a solid state and 
fashioned into uranium pellets which are about the size of pencil 
erasers.51 Those pellets are then fashioned into the fuel rods used in 
reactors to create nuclear fission.52 The enrichment and fabrication 
phases create radioactive hazards that are also addressed by the Ura-
nium Mill Tailings Act.53 
The operational phase of the fuel cycle entails the use of the ura-
nium produced by the front end of the cycle. Uranium has several 
uses, including hospital uses for x-rays, weapons production, and elec-
tricity generation. While hospital use generates low-level waste regu-
lated by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985,54 this Article concentrates on electricity generation. Electric 
utilities must address a range of environmental matters including 
plant-siting, onsite waste disposal of spent fuel, and off-site waste dis-
posal.55  Plant siting can have environmental impacts on surrounding 
land and particularly water, which is used for cooling purposes. The 
cooling process draws water from nearby streams and returns warmer 
water to them, affecting fish and other aquatic life. This process and 
its effects are addressed in detail by federal regulations.56 
The disposal of nuclear waste, however, is a larger problem. As 
noted above, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) ad-
dresses permanent waste disposal.57 The central problem with nuclear 
waste is that it is radioactive and, therefore, carcinogenic, and this ra-
dioactivity persists for thousands of years. The NWPA authorized a 
process to find a safe depository for permanent disposal; and the con-
tentious site selection process concluded by identifying Yucca Moun-
tain in Nevada as the final location, after numerous court challenges 
 
 49. WALKER, supra note 41, at 23. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7914, 7918 (2000). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. §§2 021(b)-(j) (2000). 
 55. 10 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2004). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act, supra note 47. 
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and Congressional interventions.58 Yucca Mountain was scheduled to 
begin operation, but the most recent environmental challenge has 
prompted the D.C. Circuit to order a reconsideration of the safety of 
Yucca Mountain.59 To date there is no place for final disposal of spent 
fuel. Instead, spent fuel is stored at the site of the nuclear reactor and 
those sites are given extended licenses until this matter is resolved.60 
The back-end of the fuel cycle also evokes major environmental 
concerns, comprising on-site waste disposal, plant decommissioning61 
and license renewal.62 The lack of a permanent disposal site is causing 
on-site waste disposal facilities to expand, and these expansions pre-
sent environmental and safety concerns. The major environmental is-
sue surrounding plant decommissioning is the radioactivity contained 
in the debris, and its transportation and disposal.63 Furthermore, li-
cense renewals are occurring with greater frequency than expected. 
Once, it was contemplated that nuclear plants would operate for 
about 40 years.64 Today, however, those estimates are being extended 
to 60 years65 through license renewals in order to keep the plants op-
erating.66 Extended plant life raises safety and environmental con-
cerns because of the longer lifespan of the plants. In short, the nuclear 
industry is affected by a wide range of environmental regulations that 
trace the full nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
 58. See generally Ralph Ofierski, Environmental Quality: Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 22 
ENVTL. L. 1145 (1992). 
 59. See Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The 
court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency could not rely on an estimate of 10,000 
years of safety because the Energy Policy Act of 1992 required the EPA to follow the recom-
mendation of the National Academy of Sciences which recommended a 1-million-year estimate. 
 60. See id. (stating that currently, Yucca Mountain has not been approved as a waste dis-
posal site). 
 61. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance 
NUREG-1757 (2003).  See also 10 C. F. R. pts. 50.75, 50.82, 51.53 & 51.95 (2004). 
 62. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Li-
cense Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437 (1999). 
 63. See, e.g., US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
(Jan. 2004) (decommissioning); 42 U.S.C. § 10175 (2000): 10 C.F. R. § 71 (2004) (transporta-
tion). 
 64. Union of Concerned Scientists, U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of A 
Lifetime 21 (May 2004). 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. National Energy Policy, supra note 14, at 5-17. 
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D. Contemporary Concerns 
Brief descriptions of the nuclear power industry and its regula-
tion reveal the key variables that affect nuclear policy past, present, 
and future. The fear of nuclear power has been that it can be used as 
a weapon of mass destruction with long-term consequences. After 
Three Mile Island, concern rose about the so-called China Syndrome, 
in which a reactor melts through the floor of the containment vessel 
and into the earth, figuratively finding its way to China with conse-
quent releases of heat and radioactivity polluting air, water, and 
land.67 Our fascination with nuclear power is the very idea that out of 
the atom can come massive amounts of energy that can be used not 
only for weapons but can be used to chill our beer, light our homes, 
and run our computers. 
Today, anyone thinking about a nuclear future must consider the 
following: 
 
• Will the public accept a renewal of nuclear power?68 
• Are reactors safe after Three Mile Island? 
• Is nuclear electricity cheaper than electricity generated by 
other sources? 
• How will nuclear waste be disposed? 
• How should we think about catastrophic incidents including 
weapons proliferation, climate change, and terrorist strikes at 
nuclear facilities? 
 
In short, future nuclear policy must consider energy, the economy, 
the environment, and domestic and international security. The next 
section will put all those variables into a rough equation, but until 
each of those questions can be answered with some degree of com-
fort, there will be no commercial nuclear future. 
II.  FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE AND THE BIG COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The future of nuclear power will depend on two inter-related de-
cisions — one private and one public. At some point, private utility 
investors must decide whether or not to commit financial resources to 
nuclear power. Public policymakers, similarly, must decide whether to 
commit public resources to nuclear power. Recall that nuclear power 
 
 67. See J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND 54 (2004). 
 68. See MIT Study, supra note 18, at ch. 9. 
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does not operate in a workably competitive market. Instead, the in-
dustry has always relied on government support. Without govern-
ment, there would be no commercial nuclear power industry. Al-
though these investment decisions are not identical,69 both rely on 
rough calculations, and for illustrative purposes, I will set out the cal-
culations in three equations. 
At its most basic, the decision must made be as to whether or not 
the benefits of nuclear power outweigh its costs as depicted in Equa-
tion 1: 
 
(1)   B > C 
 
Essentially, policy makers and investors must decide that elec-
tricity generated from nuclear power will be less costly than electricity 
generated from other sources. We can use two fossil fuels, coal and 
natural gas, as comparative examples for this purpose. 
In this regard, then, the first equation can be modified to show 
that a private investment decision (I) will be made when a megawatt 
of electricity from nuclear power (MwhN) is cheaper than a megawatt 
of electricity from fossil fuel power (MwhFF): 
 
(1a)   I = MwhN < MwhFF 
 
Next, investors must cost out a megawatt hour of electricity from 
both nuclear power and from fossil fuels. In this regard, the megawatt 
hour cost of nuclear power comprises: fuel costs (FC), construction 
costs (CC), operating costs (OC), waste disposal costs (WD), clean air 
costs (AC), global warming costs (GW), and other environmental 
costs (OE) such as environmental costs due to mill tailings, site 
preparation and degradation, water use effects on fish and aquatic life 
and the like. Thus, a megawatt hour of nuclear power can be repre-
sented in Equation 2: 
 
(2)   MwhN = (FC + CC+ OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)N 
 
 69. Private decision makers concentrate on return on investment and short-term gains for 
shareholders. Public decision makers should concentrate on the longer-term, public risk, safety 
and the cost of nuclear power. This broader focus, however, is not always the case. See, e.g., 
David Lochbaum, Nuclear Plant Risk Studies: Failing the Grade 2 (Aug. 2000) (arguing that Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission risk assessments undervalue the potential consequences of nu-
clear accidents in their calculations.) 
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Similarly, a megawatt hour of fossil fuel power contains the same 
variables: 
 
(2a)   MwhFF = (FC + CC + OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)FF 
 
In the end, these two formulas must be compared. And, again, a 
private investment will be made in nuclear power when nuclear gen-
erated electricity is cheaper that fossil fuel generated electricity: 
 
(2b)   MwhN = (FC + CC + OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)N < 
MwhFF = (FC + CC + OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)FF 
 
The difference between the costs of a megawatt hour of nuclear 
power and a megawatt hour of fossil fuel power can be considered the 
benefit side of the equation. As such, these equations look like a 
chain of simple additive variables. Yet, these cost equations are more 
algorithmic, given the complexity of some of the variables such as 
waste disposal and clean air costs. Nevertheless, deriving the cheaper 
price of electricity does not end even with those calculations because 
the cost side of the equation must be calculated as well. The variables 
become even more complex and greater uncertainties are introduced 
when total costs (TC) are examined. According to Judge Richard 
Posner: 
“Nuclear energy . . . is fully clean. But it is no panacea, because it is 
much costlier than power generation by plants that burn coal or 
natural gas, because of the difficulty of disposing of radioactive 
wastes, because of the danger of a catastrophic meltdown . . . be-
cause of the risk of terrorist’s obtaining fissionable materials . . . 
and because of public fears . . .”70 
Total costs, considered below in Equation 3, are especially im-
portant because public investments will be made only when the total 
cost of nuclear power is less than the total cost of fossil fuel power. 
Total costs include assessing the cost of catastrophic incidents (CI) 
surrounding nuclear power and there are three catastrophic incidents 
that must be considered. The first catastrophic incident is a core melt 
down or other reactor accident.71 This is the type of safety issue in-
 
 70. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 51-52 (2004) 
 71. See CONSTANCE PERIN, SHOULDERING RISK: THE CULTURE OF CONTROL IN THE 
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY (2005). 
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volved with Three Mile Island. The second catastrophic incident is 
the risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear installation.72 The third inci-
dent concerns nuclear weapons proliferation and is more likely to in-
volve the removal of uranium from a weapons facility rather than an 
electric utility.73 
Such concerns about catastrophic incidents give pause to poten-
tial investors as well as to policymakers. These costs are part of the 
nuclear investment equation and the costs of a catastrophic incident 
must be discounted by the probability (P) that it will happen. There-
fore, the total cost (TC) side of the equation is as follows: 
 
(3)   TC = (CI1 x P) + (CI2 x P) + (CI3 x P) 
 
Each catastrophic incident is comprised of fatalities (F), injuries 
(I), property damage (PD) and we can add psychological harms as 
well (Psy).74 
 
(3a)   CI = F + I + PD + Psy 
 
It thus remains, then, to calculate the probability of each catas-
trophic incident which leads us into the unknown. There is no reliable 
way to calculate the probability of a terrorist attack or of pilfered 
weapons grade uranium making its way into unfriendly hands.75 Vari-
ous probabilities have been estimated for reactor accidents as follows: 
 
 
 
 72. See GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE 
CATASTROPHE (2004). 
 73. See, e.g., William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are 
Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 1 (reporting the finding by US and International Atomic 
Energy Agency experts on the finding of blueprints for a 10-kiloton atomic bomb in the files of 
the Libyan weapons program.) The report also suspected that this information was the result of 
a deal made by a rogue nuclear weapons trafficker Dr. A.Q. Khan. See id. The story quotes an 
American expert as saying “[t]his was the first time we had ever seen a loose copy of a bomb 
design that clearly worked . . . and the question was: Who else had it? The Iranians? The Syri-
ans? Al Qaeda?” See id. 
 74. The courts have not been overly solicitous of claims of psychological harms. See Metro. 
Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (holding that the NRC is not 
required to evaluate potential psychological impacts when evaluating environmental impacts of 
proposed nuclear site); Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pric-
ing of Fear and Anxiety, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=466720 (Nov. 2004); Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (book review). 
 75. POSNER, supra note 70, at 174. 
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(3b)   P = 1 :: 20,000 r/y 
               1 :: 10,000 r/y 
                 1 :: 22 y 
 
During the heyday of nuclear power, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission estimated that the chance of a core meltdown was 1 
chance in 20,000 reactor years (r/y).76 In other words, the NRC esti-
mated that given 20,000 years of reactor life there was one possibility 
of a serious reactor accident. Since there are about 100 reactors then 
there is a chance that once in 200 years a reactor accident would oc-
cur. At the time, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) criticized 
the NRC Reactor Study and estimated the chance of an accident at 
1:10,000 or once in 100 years,77 and UCS criticism continues to this 
day.78 These probabilities can be compared with historic experience 
insofar as the Three Mile Island incident, a serious loss of coolant ac-
cident which could have led to a core meltdown, occurred just 22 
years after the first commercial nuclear reactor was brought online in 
1957. Estimating meltdown probabilities is, at bottom, a guessing 
game, but policymakers continue their modeling, with some growing 
historic experience to assist them.79 
Once the probabilities are calculated, then the total costs of nu-
clear power and fossil fuel power must be compared: 
 
(3c)   [(CI1 x P) + (CI2 x P) + (CI3 x P)]N < [(CI1 x P) + (CI2 x P) 
+(CI3 x P)]FF 
 
Or, more simply: 
 
(3d)   TCN < TCFF 
 
 
 76. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 (Oct. 1975); 
Severe Accident Risks, NUREG-1150 (Dec. 1990); Individual Plant Examination Program, 
NUREG-1560 (Dec. 1997). These reports calculate risk as 5 events in 100,000 r/y which is the 
same as 1 event in 20,000 r/y. 
 77. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS: A 
REVIEW OF THE NRC REACTOR SAFETY STUDY WASH -1400 (NUREG-75/014) 135 (1977) (on 
file with THE DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM). 
 78. Lochman, supra note 69, at 12. 
 79. See MIT Study, supra note 18, at ch. 6 (comparing probabilistic risk assessment with 
historic experience). See also US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Use of Risk In Nuclear Regu-
lation, at http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/rulemaking/risk-informed.html (last up-
dated Feb. 7, 2005) 
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This last equation brings up back to where we started. Invest-
ments will be made in nuclear power when B > C, or when the greater 
efficiency in electricity production outweighs the perceived risk of ca-
tastrophe. These equations are intended to be illustrative only and 
take the form of a rough cost-benefit analysis.80 Hopefully, the point 
has been made that the nuclear future depends not only on private 
investment considerations of the sort that individual investors make 
all of the time. The nuclear future also depends on gross assumptions, 
rough estimates, and the valuation of imponderables as well as uncer-
tainties affecting the public at large. Any nuclear future depends on 
such cost-benefit assessments made by public and private actors. 
III.  ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 
Assessing the most likely future for nuclear power depends upon 
the question posed. An obvious, but incomplete, question is: “What is 
the future of nuclear power?” Answering this specific question leads 
to discussion of two alternative policies. The first alternative, the 
Promotional Nuclear Policy, is driven by concerns about climate 
change caused by fossil fuel emissions. This alternative emphasizes 
the use of nuclear power over coal to generate electricity. The second 
alternative, the Precautionary Nuclear Policy, focuses on safety in-
cluding the disposal of radioactive wastes and the avoidance of the 
various nuclear catastrophes. This alternative emphasizes coal over 
nuclear power. Both alternatives accept the dominant model of en-
ergy policy with its reliance on large-scale, capital-intensive energy 
producers. 
 
 80. Cost-benefit analysis is much more complicated and it is necessary to calculate a series 
of additional variables including the value of a life, as well as the discount rates to be applied on 
both sides of the equation among many others. There is a large literature dealing with the uses 
and abuses of cost-benefit analysis and I will refer the reader to some of the more prevalent 
scholarship. For a general introduction to the methodology see, E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 1982); DAVID L. WEINER & AIDAN R. 
VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1992). For favorable scholarship 
toward cost-benefit analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE 
OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2002); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner eds., 2001) (largely favorable); POSNER, supra 
note 70. For critical scholarship, see BARUCH FISCHHOFF, THE ART OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS (1977); Mark Sagoff, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1988); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Joseph P.Tomain. Junk Eco-
nomics, 94 GEO. L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (reviewing PRICELESS). 
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A differently posed question, such as: “What is the future of en-
ergy policy?” reveals a third alternative. This broader question chal-
lenges the dominant model and suggests that clean, renewable energy 
can play a larger role in the future that it does today and can provide 
an alternative to nuclear power. This third alternative is called the 
Smart Energy Policy. 
A. Promotional Nuclear Policy 
Support for nuclear power, at least according to industry81 and 
occasional news stories,82 has been on the increase, and that support 
has been recently fueled by two claims. First, nuclear power is an im-
portant alternative to carbon-based fuels, and second, nuclear power 
can become cost competitive with those fuels. These claims of envi-
ronmental protection and low cost electricity must, however, with-
stand close scrutiny. 
The core environmental idea behind the Promotion Policy is well 
stated in the National Commission Report which recommends that 
government policies “improve the prospects for the expansion of nu-
clear energy” because of society’s interest “in abating climate-change 
risks by expanding the share of no-carbon and low-carbon energy op-
tions in the electricity-generating mix . . . .”83 According to the Na-
tional Commission Report, nuclear power accounts for nearly 70% of 
the non-carbon part of domestic electricity generation.84 
This claim about environmental sensitivity enjoys international 
and industry support as well. The Nuclear Energy Agency, a depart-
ment within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), sees the potential of nuclear power as part of a sus-
tainable development program which promotes both energy and 
economic development and environmental protection for both devel-
oped and developing countries.85 Similarly, the nuclear industry has 
 
 81. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Institute, Energy Concerns Drive Record Public 
Favorability for Nuclear Energy (June 2004). 
 82. See, e.g., Thor Vladmanis, Nuclear Power Slides Back Onto the Agenda, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 27, 2004, at 1B; Alan Cowell, Britain Feeling Pressure for Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004, 
at B1. 
 83. National Commission Report, supra note 16, at 59. 
 84. Id. at 57. 
 85. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy in a Sustainable Development Per-
spective (OECD 2000)available at 
http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/docs/2000/nddsustdev.pdf (last visited M arch 4, 2005). 
Suffice it to say here that the concept is an expansive one and that in another version of sustain-
able development nuclear power may play no role. See Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy 
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also asserted the compatibility of nuclear power with a cleaner envi-
ronment through carbon-free electricity and emissions reductions.86 
To the extent that the Promotional Nuclear Policy is premised on 
the need for non-carbon electricity generation, there is something odd 
about United States energy policy. Global warming or climate change 
is having a recognized impact on the world’s weather with hotter 
summers, more tornados, melting Arctic and Antarctic regions and 
more additional meteorological effect.87 More importantly, there is a 
scientific consensus that human, or anthropogenic, activity is a con-
tributing factor to climate change.88 Regardless, the Bush Administra-
tion has ignored the prevailing scientific consensus about the anthro-
pogenic contribution to global warming,89 has withdrawn the United 
States from any further participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and has 
 
and the Kyoto Protocol (OECD 2002) (arguing he nuclear power can help meet the green house 
gas emissions goals of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 86. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Institute, Powering the Future With Environmentally Sound 
Nuclear Energy: The Ecological Stewardship of the Nuclear Energy Industry (2003) (“In 2000, 
the nuclear energy sector accounted for 43 percent of the carbon reductions reported nation-
wide.” And, “Nuclear energy is by far the largest emission-free source of electricity in the 
United States, accounting for three-quarters of all clean-air electricity.”). See also Nuclear En-
ergy Institute, Meeting our Clean Air Needs With Emission-Free Generation: The Need for Nu-
clear Power, available at http://www.nei.org/documents/meetingneeds.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 
2005). 
 87. See, e.g., Ross Gelbspan, THE HEAT IS ON 5 – 8 (1997); Ross Gelbspan, Boiling Point 
19 – 22, 33 – 36, 63 – 66, 87 – 92, 119 – 126, 147 – 151, 171 – 174 (2004). See also Jim Motavalli 
(ed.), Feeling the Heat: Dispatches from the Frontlines of Climate Change (2004).) 
 88. The most notable organization in the world on global warming is the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is a joint effort of the World Meterological Or-
ganization and the United Nations Environment Programme and is open to all members of ei-
ther organization. In its Third Assessment Report, the IPCC states clearly that “[c]oncentrations 
of atomospheric greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing have continued to increase as a 
result of human activities.” Summary for Policymakers: A Report of Working Group I of the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 7, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/spm22-01.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2004). 
 89. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, U.S. Waters Down Global Commitment to Curb Greehnouse 
Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 6 (reporting that the United States “blocked efforts to be-
gin more substantive discussions” about reducing carbon emission pursuant to the Kyoto Proto-
col and “stood virtually alone in challenging the scientific assumptions underlying the Kyoto 
Protocol” of which the U.S. is not a part.). For other references regarding the Bush Administra-
tion’s intransigence regarding the anthropogenic causes of global warming see Robert S. De-
vine, Bush Versus the Environment 174-79 (2004); Jim Motavalli (ed.), Feeling the Heat: Dis-
patches From the Frontlines of Climate Change 7-8 (2004); Carl Pope & Paul Rauber, Strategic 
Ignorance: Why the Bush Administration is Recklessly Destroying a Century of Environmental 
Progress ch. 10 (2004); Ross Gelbspan, Boiling Point 41-61 (2004). 
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instead initiated two clean coal programs,90 neither of which have 
made any measurable contribution to emission reductions. 
In addition to environmental protection, the Promotional Nu-
clear Policy claims that nuclear power is (or can become) cost com-
petitive with fossil fuel electricity precisely because of the difficulties 
with fossil fuel emissions and, therefore, nuclear power should play a 
larger role in the future.91 The Bush Administration’s National Energy 
Policy, in this regard, argues that nuclear plants are safer, better op-
erated, and cost competitive with other fuels.92 These claims have 
some, but not complete, merit. The United States has experienced no 
nuclear incident of the magnitude of Three Mile Island since that 
event. Nevertheless, safety problems persist.93 The operating cost of 
generating electricity from old nuclear plants is cost competitive with 
electricity from coal or natural gas but that is only because the con-
struction costs have already been recouped in the rate base.94 The real 
cost of new nuclear plants, which must account for construction costs, 
is not cost competitive with alternative fossil fuels.95 There is also evi-
dence that nuclear plants are becoming better managed, thus lower-
ing costs, as managers gain in experience, and as utility consolidations 
concentrate that expertise.96 At the same time, however, universities 
 
 90. The Clear Skies Initiative: Executive Summary available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2002/02/print/clear-skies.html (Feb. 2002); Global Climate Change Initiative, available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020214.html (Feb. 2002). See also 
Department of Energy, Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) available at http://www.fossil. 
energy.gov/programs/powersystems/cleancoal/ccpi/Prog052_4P.pdf (Sept. 2004); Vision 21 
Program Plan: Clean Energy Plants for the 21st Century (Apr. 1999), available at 
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/vision21/index.html (last updated Nov. 30, 
2004). 
 91. See, e.g., David A. Repka & Kathryn M. Sutton, The Revival of Nuclear Power Plant 
Licensing, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT’L. 39 (2005). 
 92. National Energy Policy, supra note 14, at 5-15, 5-16. 
 93. See e.g., John Sullivan, Restarting a Reactor with a Flawed Part, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2004, at 33 (reporting the utility’s desire to restart the Salem nuclear power plant in New Jersey 
in face of an internal engineering report that a critical pump’s steel drive shaft was probably 
cracked and could cause an accident.) 
 94. See VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 280. Operating costs for nuclear plants are 
lower than those for coal and natural gas. “. . . America’s nuclear plants cranked out power dur-
ing the winter of 2000-2001 at an operating cost of just 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour. Coal plants 
produced it for 2.1 cents per kW-hour, while those using natural gas . . . managed only 3.5 cents 
per kW-hour.”  Id. 
 95. Construction costs for nuclear power exceed those for coal and natural gas. See Scully 
Capital, Business Case for New Nuclear Power Plants (July 2002) available at 
http://www.scullycapital.com. See also infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Biggest Utility in New Jersey Seen as 
Target of Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at B1; Dennis K, Berman & John R. 
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are turning out fewer trained nuclear engineers to become those 
managers.97 Still, the current National Energy Policy favors the pro-
motion of nuclear power by increasing the power ratings of existing 
plants, continuing to re-license plants, continuing support for the 
Price-Anderson Act, and providing tax breaks for de-
commissioning.98 
A recent study conducted at the University of Chicago regarding 
the future of nuclear power has been touted by the Department of 
Energy as demonstrating that nuclear power is cost competitive with 
coal and natural gas.99 The University of Chicago Study100 does not 
bear out that claim as it analyzes a future energy scenario which com-
pares the cost of electricity among nuclear power, coal, and natural 
gas. The Chicago Study uses what it terms the “levelized cost of elec-
tricity” (LCOE) which includes operating and annualized capital 
costs. The LCOE is used to compare the cost of nuclear generated 
electricity with electricity generated by coal and natural gas. Despite 
the DOE headline, the Chicago Study reveals that without new pro-
motional policies, nuclear power goes lacking.101 The Study further 
notes that, even under the most favorable circumstances, nuclear 
power is more expensive than either coal or natural gas.102 
In order to make nuclear power cost competitive with either coal 
or natural gas, government financial support is necessary. The Chi-
cago Study argues that through a combination of government loan 
guarantees, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, and pro-
duction tax credits, together with some aggressive assumptions about 
 
Emshwiller, Exelon Discuses Deal With PSEG, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A3; Eric Dash, 
Exelon Plans to Buy New Jersey Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C2 (reporting the poten-
tial acquisition of New Jersey’s largest utility P.S.E.&G. by the Exelon Corporation an owner of 
a number of electric utilites and an experienced manager of nuclear plants). See also 
VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 280. 
 97. VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 288. 
 98. National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy 5-15 to 5-17 (May 
2001). 
 99. DOE Press Release, University of Chicago, Nuclear Power Competitive with Coal & 
Natural Gas (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.doe.gov/engine/content.do?BT_ 
CODE=PR_PRESSRELEASES&TT_CODE=PRESSRELEASE&PUBLIC_ID=16684. 
 100. University of Chicago, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power (Aug. 2004)[hereinafter 
Chicago Study]. 
 101. Id. at 5-4. 
 102. Id. at 5-1 (“Given the capital cost range, the LCOE of new nuclear plants in the ab-
sence of policies is from $53 to $71 per MWh, with a 7-year construction time. The range is 
lower at $47 to $62 per MWh with a 5-year construction time. Costs remains outside the range 
of competitiveness with coal and gas, which have LCOE’s of $33 to $41 per MHw and $35 to $45 
per MWh respectively.”). 
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construction and management, nuclear power can become cost com-
petitive.103 The necessary financial support is significant. Production 
tax credits alone could provide $6 billion to $19.5 billion to the nu-
clear industry.104 These tax credits were proposed in the energy legis-
lation that failed in Congress in 2003.105 More specifically, in that legis-
lation, nuclear plant operators would be given 1.8 cents per kilowatt 
hour of electricity generating capacity in new nuclear plants.106  The 
Chicago Study concludes, however, by noting that “no single financial 
policy alone can definitely be counted on to bring about nuclear com-
petitiveness by 2015.”107 Another form of financial incentive is, in ef-
fect, a reverse subsidy, through which a carbon tax is levied on fossil 
fuels for the purpose of making nuclear power cost competitive with 
coal and natural gas as those prices rise.108 In addition to the financial 
incentives listed in the Chicago Study, the federal government has 
also been urged to assist the RDD&D — research, design, develop-
ment, and demonstration — of new nuclear technologies such as ad-
vanced and standardized reactor designs at a suggested $2 billion over 
the next ten years.109 
According to the Chicago Study, these financial incentives will 
only work if the construction period for new plants can be reduced to 
five years, a feat which has never yet been realized in the construction 
of nuclear power plants.110 In addition, the Study argues that before 
nuclear power can be cost competitive, aggressive learning assump-
tions must be made.111 In particular, the study states that nuclear 
power can be generated at $40 per Mwh with a 5-year construction 
 
 103. Id. at ch. 5. 
 104. See MIT Study, supra note 18, at 81 (recommending a production tax credit that would 
result in a 200 million dollar subsidy per 1000 megawatt plant which amounts to about 2 billion 
dollars paid out over several years). 
 105. Energy Policy Act 2003, H.R. 6, 108th Cong (2003). 
 106. See, e.g., Nuclear Information & Resource Service, The Energy Bill HR 6: A Gift that 
Keeps on Taking, available at http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/productiontaxcredits.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 20, 2004). 
 107. Chicago Study, supra note 100, at 9-1. 
 108. See, e.g., MIT Study, supra note 18, at 78. 
 109. National Commission Report supra note 16, at 60. See also National Energy Policy, su-
pra note 14, at 5-17. 
 110. Chicago Study, supra note 100, at 5-1. See generally JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR 
POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987). 
 111. The Chicago Study, supra note 100, also makes several financial assumptions about de-
preciation (§5.2.5); rates of return on equity (§5.3.3); rates of return on debt (§5.3.4); cost of 
capital (§5.4.2.2); and, risk premium (§5.4.2.3) all of which can have dramatic consequences on 
private investment decisions. 
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assumption only after the fifth standardized plant is built.112 Cost re-
ductions might also come from experience by reducing “first of a kind 
engineering” (FOAKE) costs and by reducing “learning by doing” 
costs. The Chicago Study goes on to note that “learning by doing will 
reduce costs beyond first plants. It will make a contribution but by it-
self is not sufficient to safely ensure self-sufficient competitiveness.”113 
FOAKE and learning by doing costs can be reduced if the “regula-
tory environment is stable, if the nuclear plant construction industry 
is competitive, and if engineering teams and construction crews are 
kept more or less continuously employed.”114 
Regardless of the increase in Promotional Policy advocates, nu-
clear power will not reemerge as a new source of electricity produc-
tion without government subsidies, aggressive assumptions about in-
vestments and construction, increased costs of generating electricity 
by fossil fuels, and advances in nuclear technologies.115 
B. Precautionary Nuclear Policy 
The simplest way to define the precautionary principle is “better 
safe than sorry.”116  Once regulators know that an “activity is likely to 
harm people or the environment, [the precautionary] principle re-
quires regulators to assume there is no safe level of human or envi-
ronmental exposure to a harmful activity in the absence of reasonable 
evidence that such a safe level exists.”117 Thus stated, the precaution-
ary principle shifts the burden to the producers of the negative exter-
nalities of proving that harm is unlikely.118 The precautionary princi-
ple is particularly pertinent to public policy questions with the 
 
 112. The Chicago Study recognizes that the five-year assumption is ambitious particularly 
considering that the Department of Energy bases its forecasting on a seven-year assumption, 
Chicago Study supra note 100, at 5-17, 5-18. 
 113. Id. at 9-2. 
 114. Id. at 4-24. The Study goes on to report that costs reductions are more reasonably as-
sumed “if the number of units that can be built at a single site is limited, and construction across 
sites is discontinuous.” 
 115. Internationally, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive nuclear construction 
program bringing on line two reactors a year between now and 2020. Even with such an aggres-
sive construction program, nuclear power, which now accounts for 2% of China’s electricity 
production, will only then account for 4% because of China’s growing demand. See Howard W. 
French, China Promotes Another Boom: Nuclear Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A1. 
 116. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 117 (2004). 
 117. A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 31-32, 
94-95 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005). 
 118. Id. at 93-96. 
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potential for catastrophic consequences, even when a scientific con-
sensus is lacking and probabilities of occurrence are low. The princi-
ple enjoys application in international environmental regulations119 
but has been subject to criticism in the United States.120 The basis of 
the criticism is that “safe is not necessarily better than sorry,” espe-
cially if efficiency and technological and scientific progress suffer.121 
Policy analysts who argue against expansion of nuclear power 
use two arguments. The first argument is that nuclear power is simply 
not cost competitive with other fuels. The second argument is that 
safety and risk concerns still exist and, in fact, are of increasing con-
cern given the rise of terrorism in the world.122 
The Natural Resources Defense Counsel, by way of example, 
“neither expects nor supports a nuclear power revival.”123 The NRDC 
argues that nuclear plants are simply not cost competitive with other 
sources of electricity generation. According to their study, cleaner al-
ternatives such as energy efficiency, wind, biomass, and solar power 
can be made operational sooner and more cheaply than nuclear 
power.124 In addition, nuclear power is unattractive because of the risk 
of weapons proliferation, unsafe reactor design, a too favorable Price-
Anderson Act subsidy, and because there is still no operationally safe, 
permanent waste depository.125 
The Union of Concerned Scientists has for decades served as the 
watchdog group over matters of reactor safety. Not surprisingly then, 
their recent study concentrates on the safety features of nuclear 
power and concludes that “[b]y failing to consistently enforce the 
regulations, the NRC exposes millions of Americans to greater risk 
than necessary.”126 The UCS argues that one must not think about the 
safety of nuclear power plants in a linear way. Instead, safety assump-
 
 119. See, e.g., ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development — Principle 15, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/?DocumentID= 
78&ArticleID=1163 (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
 120. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment 17-21 (Oct. 2004) 
(arguing that the precautionary principle is incoherent), available at http://www.law.uchicago. 
edu/ Lawecon/index.html; POSNER, supra note 70, at 139 – 150. 
 121. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 102-05 (2002). 
 122. See generally ALLISON, supra note 72. 
 123. Daniel Lashof & Patricio Silva, A Responsible Energy Policy for the 21st Century 18 
(Mar. 2001). 
 124. Id. at 19. 
 125. Id. at 18 – 21. 
 126. David Lochbaum, U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of a Lifetime 2 
(May 2004). 
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tions must be made along what they term a “bathtub curve.”127 By this 
term, the UCS means that risk starts high in the initial years of a 
plants life as they are coming online, abating for a period of time until 
the plant’s become older, during which time safety concerns increase.  
In other words, for those advocates of nuclear power, their assertions 
that plants are enjoying good safety records is true along the low flat 
part of the bathtub curve, which is the part of the curve most plants 
are experiencing today.128 Safety risks will increase, according to the 
study, as nuclear plants age.129 The UCS then urges that NRC safety 
inspections must be increased, as must public participation in the reli-
censing process. They argue, further, that risk analyses for nuclear 
power are inadequate, and that if nuclear power is to be given a true 
market test, then Price-Anderson Act protection must be eliminated, 
at least for new plants. In other words, UCS takes the position that 
nuclear power cannot pass a market test and, therefore, further subsi-
dies in the face of safety concerns are not warranted. The UCS then 
makes a series of recommendations, all aimed at improving NRC per-
formance throughout the life cycle of a nuclear plant.130 
The recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of the 
future of nuclear power is also cautious, arguing that nuclear power 
should be an option for reducing carbon emissions but at present 
“[T]his is unlikely: nuclear power faces stagnation and decline.”131 The 
MIT Study argues that for nuclear power expansion to succeed, sev-
eral substantial hurdles must be cleared including: 
 
• nuclear power must become cost competitive with coal or 
natural gas; 
• carbon emission credits can help nuclear power; 
• nuclear power must have improved safety through “best 
practices” in construction and operation; 
• waste disposal issues must be satisfactory addressed; 
• international safeguards against proliferation must be main-
tained; and, 
 
 127. Id. at ch. 1. 
 128. Id. at ch. 3. 
 129. Id. at ch 4. 
 130. Id. at 9 – 10,17 – 18, 21 – 22. 
 131. MIT Study, supra note 18, at ix. 
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• nuclear power generation must be limited to once-through 
fuel cycles rather than reprocessing.132 
 
The Precautionary Policy, thus, is skeptical about the future of 
nuclear power. Nuclear does not appear to pass a market test, has in-
creasing safety concerns, and does not have great promise for replac-
ing fossil fuels.  Presumably, if those hurdles are cleared, there can be 
a nuclear future. 
C. Smart Energy Policy 
The third policy alternative—the Smart Energy Policy—is distin-
guishable from the Promotional Policy and from the Precautionary 
Policy because the latter policies contemplate large-scale power pro-
ducers and design their energy policies accordingly. The Smart Policy, 
to the contrary, articulates an energy future that does not rely on the 
dominant model, because that model is hazardous to our collective 
health and to the health of the environment.133 Instead, the Smart Pol-
icy promotes small-scale, clean, renewable energy sources which are 
more environmentally friendly and less prone to catastrophic inci-
dents.134 
More than twenty-five years after publication of Soft Energy 
Paths, its author, Amory Lovins, is now being recognized as a serious 
thinker and contributor to our energy future by a wide and bipartisan 
group of energy policy actors.135 In Soft Energy Paths, as well as in 
other publications, Lovins was clear about the utility of nuclear 
power—he saw little usefulness for it.136 His great metaphor for nu-
clear generated electricity is that a nuclear power plant is nothing 
other than a large tea kettle, and heating water for that kettle with 
 
 132. Reprocessing creates plutonium which is longer-lived, more dangerous, and more sus-
ceptible to weapons proliferation. This process is also know as a closed cycle and remains in dis-
favor across the board. MIT Study, surpa note 18, at ch. 4; Chicago Study supra note 100, at Ap-
pendix A5; ALLISION, dupra note 72, at ch. 7. 
 133. LOVINS, supra note 3, at chs. 1, 2, & 5. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Lovins has recently been referred to as the Sage of Snowmass by liberals and conserva-
tives alike. See, e.g., President Reagan’s National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, A Decla-
ration of Energy Independence, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A15 (favorably reviewing Lovins 
book Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovation for Profits, Jobs and Security ). See also 
http://www.oilendgame.org and VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 13-16. 
 136. See, e.g., AMORY B. LOVINS & JOHN H. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE 
FOR AND ETHICAL ENERGY STRATEGY (1975). 
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nuclear power is “like cutting butter with a chain saw.”137 Lovins’ 
analysis goes well beyond just staking out an anti-nuclear power posi-
tion. His larger target is the dominant model of energy policy; His 
professional career has been dedicated to developing an alternative 
energy policy that relies on small-scale, clean, renewable energy pro-
duction instead of large-scale, dirty, fossil-fuel energy.138 
The No Nukes dimension of this alternative is straight forward 
but not terribly likely to come about in the near term because of the 
large role currently being played by nuclear power and our continued 
preference for large-scale power production. The active dimension of 
the Smart Policy involves technological innovation as well as restruc-
turing the production and distribution of electricity.139 A key aspect of 
this policy alternative involves distributed generation (DG), which 
presents an alternative electricity policy focusing on small-scale 
power production.140 The core concept behind DG is that power will 
be produced locally instead of relying on large regional grids for 
transmission and distribution.141 DG power producers will be much 
smaller and will rely on a variety of energy sources and technologies. 
What these producers have in common is that they are not tradition-
ally structured utilities and can operate without reliance on the grid. 
DG technologies include gas or diesel-fired engines, small tur-
bines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic cells.142 While some of these fuel 
sources are fossil fuels, it is contemplated that DG technologies will 
capture both heat and power, thereby increasing energy efficiency. 
Other fuel sources are renewable, and therefore cleaner than the fos-
sil fuels burned in large-scale plants. Not all DG technologies are cur-
rently cost effective, thus raising the question of whether or not gov-
ernment financial incentives are better applied to nuclear power or to 
smart energy markets and technologies. 
 
 137. LOVINS, supra note 3. 
 138. See also AMORY B. LOVINS ET ALS., SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS 
OF MAKING ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE RIGHT SIZE (2002) 
 139. Id. 
 140. The International Energy Agency defines “distributed generation” as ‘generating plant 
serving a customer on-site or providing support to a distribution network, connected to the grid 
at distribution-level voltages. The technologies generally include engines, small (and micro) tur-
bines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic systems. It generally excludes wind power, since that is mostly 
produced on wind farms rather than for on-site power requirement.” International Energy 
Agency, Distributed Generation in Liberalised Electricity Markets 19 (2002). 
 141. Id. 
 142. LOVINS, supra note 138, at § 1.2. 
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Another term for distributed generation is micropower, which 
also involves new technologies including microturbines, hydrogen fu-
els, solar cells, landfill gases, and the like. In this regard, micropower 
is touted as a clean energy alternative. According to the International 
Energy Agency these technologies are increasing in importance and 
“[w]orldwide, more DG capacity was ordered in 2000 than for nuclear 
power.”143 Not too much should be taken from this statement because 
of the decrease in orders for new nuclear plants. Still, it is fair to as-
sert a worldwide rise in DG and micropower.144 
DG and micropower are dependent upon significant technologi-
cal improvements in electricity production, transmission, distribution, 
and consumption. Most simply, the scale of generation units is re-
duced significantly and they are widely dispersed.145 “Smart energy” 
technologies are intended to reduce the size of power generation 
units; to be closer to the source of consumption; to utilize “smart 
grids,” which will transmit power more efficiently; and to use “smart 
meters,” which will provide consumers with more information about 
their consumption patterns and about their choice of providers.146 
The Smart Energy Policy is a return to the electricity future. 
When Edison flipped the switch at Pearl Street Station in New York 
City on September 4, 1882, the first electricity company went into op-
eration and did so on a small scale.147 Technological advances enabled 
the effective nationalization of the electricity grid in the early part of 
the Twentieth Century.148 Today, we find ourselves contemplating a 
return to small scale production because it promises economic effi-
ciencies by removing producers from the grid; environmental benefits 
through greater energy efficiencies and increased use of renewable 
energy resources; and energy security advantages from terrorist at-
tack, international supply disruptions, or catastrophic accidents. 
 
 143. International Energy Agency, supra note 140, at 7. 
 144. There is also an increase in the number of smart energy providers of information and 
products. See, e.g., http://www.smartpower.org; http://www.smart-nrg.com; http://www.climate 
solutions.org; http://www.elpc.org/energy/. 
 145. VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8. 
 146. Energy Future Coalition, Challenge and Opportunity: Charting a New EnergyFuture 
Appendix A(4), at http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/full_report/index.shtm (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2004). 
 147. LEONARD S. HYMAN, ANDREW S. HYMAN & ROBERT C. HYMAN, AMERICA’S 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE ch. 14 (7th ed.2000). 
 148. JILL JONNES, EMPIRE OF LIGHT (2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
Global warming has revived interest in nuclear power. How 
much interest remains to be seen. Still, the most significant statement 
that can be made about nuclear power is that this energy source is on 
the table for discussion more than it has been for over 25 years, be-
cause of the environmental degradation caused by burning fossil fu-
els.149 Traditional nuclear industry and trade association interests have 
taken advantage of this phenomenon to continue to advocate their 
Promotional Policy regarding nuclear power. Nuclear agnostics have 
added this issue to their own future energy policies because it is an at-
tractive alternative to oil and other fossil fuels, which, in addition to 
their role in climate change, are becoming more difficult to find and 
secure and, therefore, higher priced. Nevertheless, nuclear power’s 
problems persist. 
Economic efficiency, environmental protection, energy security, 
and potential catastrophes are the building blocks of any energy fu-
ture. For some policymakers, nuclear power plays a central role in de-
signing that future. If, however, a report card were issued for nuclear 
power, then chances are that nuclear power would not graduate to the 
energy policy of the immediate future. Instead, nuclear power would 
receive failing grades in each category. 
Without government subsidies or financial incentives, nuclear 
power is not, nor is it projected to be, cost competitive with fossil fu-
els. While environmentally attractive because of its carbon-free emis-
sions, the nuclear industry has not satisfactorily addressed waste dis-
posal matters. Neither on-site expansion of spent storage facilities, 
nor permanent disposal at Yucca Mountain resolve the outstanding 
environmental issues yet. Nor does nuclear power achieve even pass-
ing grades on energy security and catastrophic incidents if future en-
ergy policy adopts a precautionary principle. A Precautionary Policy 
would force nuclear power providers to demonstrate the safety and 
security of their facilities and reactors; and that proof remains a chal-
lenge. Absent a precautionary principle, however, nuclear power 
would receive incomplete grades on both scores because of the mag-
nitude of uncertainties. 
What, then, is the future of nuclear power? The safest answer is 
“More of the same with a twist.” Nuclear power will continue to pro-
 
 149. See, e.g., VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 278 (“What is fair to say is that after many 
years of ignoring nuclear power, policymakers are now starting to engage the issue once 
again.”). 
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vide about 20% of the country’s electricity needs. Old plants will be 
relicensed. On-site waste depositories will expand and Yucca Moun-
tain will eventually receive approval as the permanent off-site waste 
storage facility. Price-Anderson Act support will continue, as will 
federal funds earmarked for nuclear RDD&D. The twist is that grow-
ing concerns about global climate change and national and interna-
tional security have changed the terms of the debate about nuclear 
power’s future. The changed debate raises a serious question about 
continuing to invest in nuclear power instead of investing in smart 
power. 
A Smart Energy Policy provides a real alternative not only to 
nuclear power but also to the dominant model of national energy pol-
icy. There will be no new nuclear power in a Smart Energy Policy. In-
stead nuclear energy will play a transitional role. Cleaner and renew-
able energy resources will be used. Smaller, dispersed, energy 
efficient technologies are also a part of a Smart Energy Policy which 
sends more accurate price signals, increases consumer choice, and of-
fers energy independence and security. The optimum nuclear future is 
then transitional, as we continue to use the nuclear power that we 
have, and as we begin to shift public and private investments into 
Smart Energy markets. 
